When Anarchism Ceases to Be Anarchist: Liberalism, Subjectivism and the Loss of the Revolutionary Horizon

Below is the second of two texts produced by Spanish libertarian writers., this time from a member of the Spanish anarchist organisation Liza, based in Granada and Madrid. We reproduce these texts, not because we necessarily agree 100 per cent with their arguments, but because they make valuable and stimulating arguments, necessary for the strengthening and development of anarchist communism.

There is a discussion within anarchism that for too long has been relegated to the background. It is not a question of determining who possesses an anarchist certificate of authenticity or of establishing a doctrinal orthodoxy. It is a question of examining what conception of society, freedom, power, conflict and social transformation really sustains a given position and what political consequences follow from it.

Table of Contents

Anarchism is not only a negation of the state, an abstract defence of individual freedom, a cultural sensibility, or a collection of horizontal practices. In the anarchist tradition, emancipation implies transforming the social relations of domination and developing forms of self-management capable of replacing them through a revolutionary process. Felipe Corrêa has synthesised this conception through three articulated elements: revolution, critique of domination and defence of self-management.

This definition allows us to establish a fundamental starting point. Anarchism cannot be defined only by what it rejects. Its specificity also lies in the social relations it seeks to build and in the forces capable of making them possible. The question is not only whether a position is anti-state, anti-capitalist or pro-freedom, but also to determine what it means by these concepts, what social relations it identifies as the foundation of domination and how it intends to transform them.

It is from this perspective that it becomes important to examine the liberal and subjectivist influences that run through certain sectors of contemporary anarchism. The problem is not the intellectual origin of each concept considered in isolation. This is what happens when certain categories modify the way in which society is understood to the point of displacing the analysis of social relations, organisation and revolution.

1. Liberalism does not necessarily enter through the front door

When one speaks of liberal influences within anarchism, the most immediate reaction is to seek an explicit defence of the market, private property, or the minimal state. That search can overlook much deeper forms of influence.

Luigi Fabbri already warned about the so-called “bourgeois influences” within anarchism. The problem was not necessarily that the anarchists affected by them consciously became defenders of the bourgeoisie. It consisted of the incorporation of categories produced by bourgeois society that could alter the understanding of organisation, solidarity, social struggle and revolution.

Liberal influence can operate, therefore, by preserving the libertarian vocabulary while transforming the categories through which reality is interpreted. Autonomy, freedom, resistance or emancipation can maintain a radical appearance while detached from the material relations that provide them with political content.

Displacement appears when the individual becomes the privileged unit of analysis, when autonomy is separated from collective organisation, when immediate resistance replaces strategy, or when subjective will begins to explain phenomena determined by historical relations. It also appears when identity displaces material positions, when personal transformation is presented as equivalent to social transformation, or when the critique of the State replaces the analysis of the relations of domination in which it is inserted.

It is not a question of affirming that every defence of individual autonomy is liberal. Nor is it a question of reducing anarchism to a sociology of classes. The question is different. The individual and the collective are not confronting realities. They are in a historical relationship of mutual constitution. The individual acts within social relations that he has not created and these relations can be reproduced or transformed through conscious and collective action.

Ideological filtering becomes problematic precisely when this relationship breaks down and one of its terms goes on to explain the other. When society appears as the result of autonomous individuals who subsequently relate, social structures cease to be the starting point of analysis. When, on the other hand, the collective becomes an abstraction placed above those who compose it, individual autonomy is also annulled. A coherent anarchist perspective needs to reject both reductions.

2. The problem of the abstract individual

Vladimir Benoit’s critique of the so-called “anarchist liberalism” is useful in specifying this problem. Its central concept is methodological individualism, understood as the tendency to take the isolated individual as a fundamental unit to explain society.

From this perspective, classes, organisations, unions, and social movements end up appearing as aggregates of individuals. Society is explained on the basis of the particular decisions of its members rather than on the basis of historical relations that determine the conditions under which those decisions can occur.

This does not imply denying the individual or his autonomy. Nor does it mean that every individualistic conception of freedom is necessarily liberal. The problem arises when the isolated individual becomes a sufficient explanation of phenomena that possess a relational existence.

Exploitation is not the sum of personal experiences of precariousness. Wage labor is not simply a choice repeated by millions of individuals. Property is not a private preference. The State cannot be understood as the cumulative result of particular administrative decisions. All these realities express historical relations that condition the action of individuals and that, at the same time, are reproduced or disputed through their activity.

Reversing this relationship has political consequences. A social structure can end up being translated into the language of individual experience. Exploitation becomes personal precariousness. Domination becomes interpersonal relationships. Organisation appears as a matter of preferences. Social conflict becomes a problem of conscience, identity or behaviour.

The result is an impoverished conception of politics. Society ceases to appear as a historical totality traversed by power relations and material antagonisms and begins to be conceived as the sum of particular experiences whose subsequent articulation would produce the collective.

The problem is not to recognise the individual dimension of oppression. The problem is to turn it into the fundamental explanation of relationships that exist before each individual and that require collective intervention to be transformed.

3. From social analysis to psychologism

When the individual occupies the centre of the analysis, the will inevitably acquires an increasing weight. If social phenomena are explained mainly by the decisions and dispositions of the subjects, politics ends up concentrating on what they do, think or represent.

From this arises a form of radicalism focused on the permanent evaluation of individual coherence. It examines whether a person is sufficiently autonomous, whether he or she reproduces authority, whether he or she maintains horizontal practices, whether he or she uses appropriate language or whether his or her interpersonal relationships reproduce certain forms of domination.

These issues can be politically relevant. The transformation of everyday relations and the critique of the forms of power that run through social life are part of the anarchist tradition. The problem begins when this level replaces the analysis of the social relations that make these behaviours possible.

A material perspective demands different questions. What relationships produce a certain situation? Who controls the resources and the means of production? How is exploitation reproduced? Which institutions guarantee its continuity? What social forces can confront it? What organisational capacity exists to intervene on it?

The difference is not merely methodological. A policy focused on subjective coherence tends to turn conflict into a moral issue. A policy oriented to the analysis of social relations seeks to identify forces, interests, structures and organisational capacities.

The will is indispensable for any conscious transformation, but it does not explain by itself the conditions under which it can act. Revolutionary consciousness does not exist outside of history. It is formed within certain social relations and acquires transformative capacity when it is articulated with a collective practice capable of intervening on them.

Emancipation therefore requires subjective transformation and social transformation. The former may contribute to the latter, but it cannot replace it.

4. When Anarchy Becomes an Ideal Type

There is another form of abstraction that operates in a seemingly opposite direction. It consists in converting a certain representation of “Anarchy” into the criterion by which every concrete practice is immediately judged.

In this case, anarchy ceases to function as a political horizon and set of guiding principles to become an idealised model against which organisations, demands and experiences are evaluated. That which does not coincide with the model appears to be insufficiently anarchist, while that which reproduces certain formal features can be elevated to an expression of anarchy.

The relationship between theory and reality is thus inverted. Instead of using principles to guide the analysis of concrete historical situations, an abstract image of the future is used to judge reality from outside its contradictions.

A revolutionary policy demands something different. A demand, an organisation or a collective experience must be analysed in terms of the social relations they express, the forces they mobilise, the interests they confront, the contradictions they contain and the possibilities they open.

This does not mean abandoning principles. On the contrary, principles are necessary precisely because they make it possible to determine the emancipatory meaning of a transformation and to distinguish anarchism from other forms of radicalism. What must be rejected is to turn them into a finished description of every historical experience.

The difference is decisive. Principles guide practice. The ideal type is intended to replace concrete analysis. The former allow us to intervene without losing sight of the revolutionary horizon. The second can turn anarchy into a morality external to history.

Anarchism does not need to find experiences that perfectly reproduce an imagined future society. It needs to understand existing conditions, intervene on their contradictions and develop the forces capable of transforming them.

5. Classes as social relations

This question appears with particular clarity in the conception of social classes. Formally recognising the existence of workers and capitalists is not enough. It is also necessary to understand what makes them class.

A class is not a statistical set of individuals who share income, professions, or economic characteristics. It is a historically determined social relation. The existence of the working class depends on certain relations of property, production, work and appropriation. The capitalist class occupies the corresponding position within these same relations.

The capitalist is not simply a wealthy individual. The worker is not simply someone who receives a salary. Both occupy social positions determined by a structure that conditions their possibilities of action and whose reproduction depends on concrete practices.

Therefore, the class struggle cannot be reduced to a psychological conflict between groups of individuals. Its foundation lies in objective social relations that produce differentiated positions within the reproduction of society. Individuals participate in them and can face them, but they do not produce them through their isolated decisions.

Nor does this imply reducing all domination to the economy. The state, gender, racism, culture, and ideology all have specific dynamics. A rigorous materialism does not consist in converting all contradictions into a mechanical reflection of the economy, but in situating them within the historical and material relations that condition its development.

The issue is the same again. Where the relational dimension disappears, structures can end up being interpreted as effects of individual consciousness. Social transformation is then subordinated to the modification of the attitudes of the subjects.

But a social relationship does not disappear because the subjective dispositions of those who participate in it change. It requires a transformation of the conditions that allow it to be reproduced.

6. Liberal freedom and anarchist freedom

The difference between the liberal and anarchist conceptions of freedom cannot be reduced to affirming that one defends freedom and the other seeks to expand it. Both traditions contain different positions, but there is a fundamental difference in the way of understanding the social conditions of freedom.

A liberal conception can understand freedom as the existence of a sphere of action protected against external interference, particularly against political power. The central problem is then to determine which restrictions must be eliminated in order to preserve individual decision-making capacity.

Anarchism introduces an additional question. It is not enough to ask what interference the individual is formally protected from. It is also necessary to ask under what material conditions he can effectively exercise his freedom.

Legal equality does not eliminate inequalities arising from property relations. A worker can be legally free and materially dependent on the sale of his labor power. He may enjoy the same formal rights as the owner of a company and yet lack equivalent capacity to decide on the conditions of production.

From an anarchist perspective, freedom cannot be separated from the social relations that allow it to be exercised. It does not only consist of having a private space in front of authority, but of participating in relationships where no one is subject to a separate power and where the conditions of existence can be decided collectively.

Freedom thus acquires a material and social dimension. It is not only a matter of limiting political power, but of transforming the relations that produce dependence and subordination. Hence the question of freedom leads directly to self-management.

7. Self-management, organisation and anti-statism

Self-management does not mean that each individual manages his or her own affairs in isolation. It means that those who participate in a social activity can collectively control the conditions in which it takes place.

That is why it presupposes organisation. Production, distribution, deliberation and collective life require coordination. The anarchist problem is not to eliminate any organisational structure, but to prevent coordination from becoming a separate body capable of imposing decisions on those who constitute it.

Autonomy and organisation are not, therefore, contradictory terms. An organisation can expand the effective capacity of individuals precisely because it allows the coordination of forces that would remain isolated without it. The decisive question is how functions are distributed, who controls decisions, how delegations are revoked and what mechanisms prevent the formation of a separate power.

Federalism expresses this logic at the level of articulation between different social units. It is not simply administrative decentralisation. It involves coordinating organisations and communities through structures subject to the control of those who constitute them. But neither can political decentralisation be reduced to a sufficient solution. Territorially distributing power does not in itself eliminate exploitation or transform property relations.

This explains why isolated anti-statism is not enough to define anarchist politics. Opposing the state can coexist with very different conceptions of property, the economy, and social organisation. Reducing state functions does not necessarily equate to abolishing the relations of domination that structure society.

The anarchist problem is not simply to determine how much power the state should have. It consists of transforming the social conditions that make possible the separation between those who govern and those who are governed.

Therefore, abolishing an institution without transforming the relations that reproduce domination can leave intact the conditions for it to reappear in another form. Anti-statism acquires its revolutionary meaning when it is articulated with the transformation of property relations, social equality, collective organisation and self-management.

Self-management thus constitutes the positive dimension of anti-statism. It responds not only to who should not govern, but to how the conditions of social life can be organised without producing a separate instance of power.

8. From Stirner to the Politics of Subjectivity

Max Stirner’s critique introduces a question that deserves to be treated more precisely. To reduce his thought to a simple radical liberalism would be insufficient. A central part of his work is to question the abstractions that acquire authority over the individual. The state, citizenship, morality, humanity, or “man” can become entities to which people must subordinate themselves.

This critique retains an obvious utility for anarchism. No collective category should be transformed into a sacred entity placed above those who constitute it. But it does not follow that every collective category is an illegitimate abstraction.

A class can express a real social relation without becoming a metaphysical essence. An organisation can perform a political function without becoming a sacred entity. A society can be the object of collective transformation without being elevated to a transcendent subject.

The problem is not in using collective categories, but in substantiating them and separating them from the concrete relations that provide them with content.

This question acquires special relevance in certain contemporary currents that have developed critiques of fixed identities, universal subjects and essentialist categories. There is no linear continuity between Stirner, Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and the so-called “post-anarchism”. However, certain theoretical concerns have acquired considerable influence in sectors of contemporary libertarian thought.

These tools can be productive when they question naturalised forms of power or rigid conceptions of subjects. The problem arises when the critique of identity becomes a critique of concrete social positions. The fact that an identity is not an immutable essence does not mean that the social relations associated with it lack reality. The fact that class is historically changing does not mean that class relations disappear. The fact that an organisation can produce power relations does not mean that all organisation is equivalent to domination.

Displacement becomes politically problematic when revolution comes to be conceived primarily as a transformation of subjectivity. Everyday resistance can then acquire a centrality that displaces stable organisation, strategy and structural transformation.

Here it is important to distinguish revolution and insurrection. An insurrection may imply a break with existing forms of subjectivity and authority. A revolution, on the other hand, also involves a transformation of social relations and institutions. Both dimensions can be part of the same process, but they are not equivalent.

Transforming subjectivity can contribute to an emancipatory practice. It cannot replace the transformation of relations that reproduce exploitation and domination.

The problem is not to recognise the importance of subjectivity or to deny that power runs through everyday relationships. It is to prevent this analysis from completely absorbing the terrain of revolutionary politics. A multiplicity of resistances can produce cultural and subjective changes without substantially modifying property, work, production or institutional forms of power.

The revolutionary question remains intact. What forces can transform existing relationships? What forms of organisation can articulate them, and what strategy can turn these dispersed capacities into a historical force?

9. From liberal filtration to the loss of the revolutionary horizon

Liberal influences can also be produced through the co-optation of the libertarian vocabulary itself. Shelagh Roxburgh’s research on so-called soft anarchism is illustrative in showing how concepts associated with anarchism can be incorporated into liberal frameworks, particularly in the theory of international relations.

Networks, decentralisation, cooperation, resistance, and non-state actors can be integrated into governance discourses without necessarily retaining their anti-capitalist content. The effectiveness of this co-optation lies precisely in the fact that it does not need to eliminate radical language. It can preserve words while modifying the conceptual relationships that gave them meaning.

Autonomy can be detached from ownership. Cooperation can be separated from exploitation. Resistance can be reduced to a permanent practice without a revolutionary horizon. Decentralisation can become an administrative technique. Participation can exist without effective control over resources.

Here Fabbri’s notion of “bourgeois leaks” becomes important again. Its usefulness lies not in classifying people as bourgeois or revolutionary, but in analysing how categories produced within bourgeois society can be incorporated into an emancipatory theory and modify its presuppositions.

Bourgeois society does not produce only certain economic relations. It also produces historical conceptions of the individual, freedom, property, competition, responsibility, and autonomy that can be presented as universal. When these categories organise political analysis, essentially social relations can end up being interpreted as individual problems.

The same displacement can affect the conception of class and organisation. If structures are translated into personal experiences, class ceases to appear as a social relation. If every organisation is treated primarily as a potential source of hierarchy, the need to build collective capacities can become a problem in itself.

The critique of rigid identities can serve to combat essentialisms. It does not justify, however, abandoning social relations as an object of analysis. Similarly, recognising that organisations can produce power does not imply that organising is tantamount to reproducing domination.

The result of these successive reductions can be a policy focused on local resistances, subjective practices and daily ruptures. Such experiences can be part of a revolutionary strategy. They become a substitute for revolution when they are no longer linked to the transformation of social relations.

The problem then reaches its clearest form. Revolutionary language can survive after that which made it revolutionary has disappeared. Autonomy, cooperation, participation, decentralisation and resistance can coexist with the existing order if they are separated from ownership, exploitation, social conflict and self-management.

The question is not whether certain practices are radical enough. It is whether they contribute to the development of the forces capable of transforming the social relations that produce domination.

10. Towards a social and revolutionary reconstruction of anarchism

Recovering the revolutionary horizon does not require building a closed doctrine. It requires the re-establishment of a coherent relationship between freedom, material conditions, social relations, organisation and collective capacity.

Anarchist freedom cannot be reduced to the absence of interference or to legal equality. Its exercise depends on specific conditions such as access to resources, time, education, decision-making capacity and control over living conditions. Therefore, emancipation requires transforming the relations that produce dependence, including the ownership of the means of production and the organisation of work.

Self-management expresses this transformation in positive terms. It does not mean simply participating in decisions, but collectively exercising control over the social conditions that determine one’s existence.

Nor can anti-statism constitute a separate program. Abolishing the State requires transforming the relations that make possible the separation between rulers and ruled, but also those that produce economic dependence and concentration of power. The question is not only which institution should disappear, but what social forms can make its existence unnecessary.

This places organisation at the centre of the revolutionary problem. Organisation does not mean authority by definition. What is decisive are the power relations it establishes, the mechanisms of control over its functions, the participation of its members and the possibility of revoking delegations. An organised structure can reproduce domination or expand the collective capacity of those who make it up.

Malatesta linked revolution to conscious action, organisation, and the creation of new social relations. The militants of Dyelo Truda, starting from their interpretation of the Russian Revolution, also insisted on the problems arising from the absence of an anarchist organisation capable of coordinating a coherent revolutionary intervention. This does not make platformism a mandatory model. Its relevance lies in a more general question: a revolutionary force needs mechanisms capable of coordinating action without separating the political leadership from those who produce it.

The same perspective allows us to distinguish reform and reformism. A partial claim can improve living conditions and strengthen the organisation. It becomes reformism when it ceases to be part of a strategy of transformation and becomes the definitive horizon. Nor does the revolution need be reduced to a single insurrectionary moment. It can develop through a prolonged process of conflict, organisation, self-management, and social transformation, provided that the partial struggles maintain a conscious relationship with that horizon.

Murray Bookchin’s critique of so-called lifestyle anarchism is pertinent here, even if his opposition between “social anarchism” and “lifestyle anarchism” is too rigid to encompass the historical plurality of anarchism. Individual practices can contribute to an emancipatory culture, but they do not in themselves replace the transformation of social structures. The problem is not personal transformation. It is to make it the main terrain of revolutionary politics.

Defending a social perspective does not mean sacrificing the individual to an abstract collectivity. Individual and society are inseparable dimensions of human existence. Cooperation can expand individual freedom when it allows for collective control over material living conditions. Anarchist communism does not conceive of the community as a negation of individuality, but as a condition for its development without subordination.

The historical plurality of anarchism does not oblige relativism either. It is not necessary to construct a closed canon or to establish a definitive definition of anarchism. But recognising diversity does not mean considering all conceptions of freedom, domination, organisation, and revolution as equivalent. Different diagnoses produce different strategies.

The relevant criterion is not doctrinal purity, but coherence between the analysis of social relations, the emancipatory horizon and the means proposed to achieve it.

Contributions from other intellectual traditions can be incorporated critically. A revolutionary theory does not need to isolate itself intellectually. It needs to retain the capacity to subject any conceptual tool to its own emancipatory objectives and reject those categories that end up hiding the relations it seeks to transform.

The social and revolutionary reconstruction of anarchism therefore involves recovering a perspective capable of linking autonomy and collective capacity, freedom and material conditions, anti-statism and social transformation, concrete struggles and revolutionary strategy.

It is not a question of preserving a doctrinal identity in the face of all external influence. It is a matter of preventing concepts such as freedom, autonomy, resistance or participation from being separated from the social relations that provide them with political content.

The fundamental question remains open, but it is not ambiguous. What relations of domination must be abolished, what social forms can replace them and what collective capacity is necessary to make this transformation possible.

Don Diego de la Vega, militant of Liza.

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